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Abstract
Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, 
alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated hat could provide a high level of 
benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological 
factors that affect producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggests that 
producer referendum play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is 
maximized by a Provision Point Mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds 
ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the 
level o f  advertising effectiveness.
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Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising:
An Experimental Analysis
Generic advertising programs have been a popular tool used by many agricultural 
commodity organizations in the United States to enhance market demand, raise prices, 
and increase producer net revenue. These programs operate by assessing producers in an 
industry and using the collected funds for generic (non-branded) advertising and 
promotion of the commodity. Currently, there are thirteen federal programs and over 
fifty state programs in existence. The majority of economic studies evaluating generic 
advertising programs have found large benefits for producers relative to costs.
Funding for some commodity programs originally came from voluntary donations 
from participants via a voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). While initial 
contributions for the advertising programs using a VCM were typically high, free-riding 
and decreased donations eventually became a significant problem, raising questions of 
equity and fairness. As a result of these concerns, essentially all VCMs were abandoned 
and producers held referenda on whether to adopt mandatory assessments to fund the 
advertising programs. Virtually all programs in operation today are mandatory, as all 
producers are required to pay assessments based on their marketing volume.
However, some individual producers have recently challenged the 
constitutionality of mandatory generic advertising programs arguing that being required 
to contribute money to generic advertising programs is an infringement of their rights to 
free speech. Currently, there are over 70 First Amendment challenges to generic 
advertising programs being litigated. To date, there have been decisions delivered by
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district and circuit courts on both sides of the issue, upholding the constitutionality of 
some of the programs and ruling others unconstitutional. In their review of these 
lawsuits, Crespi and Sexton conclude that court actions from parties opposed to 
mandatory participation threaten to undermine the current system of generic advertising. 
Because of these challenges, there is a need to assess whether a new institutional 
arrangement that maintains the voluntary spirit of the court findings will achieve the 
same goals and benefits of generic advertising.
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued opinions in two cases and will be hearing a 
third case in 2005. In Glickman v. Wileman (1997), the Court ruled that the advertising 
program for California peaches, plums, and nectarines does not violate the First 
Amendment. The Court reasoned that generic advertising was part of a broader set of 
economic regulations (i.e., a marketing order) in which producers were already 
“constrained by the regulatory scheme,” and hence exempt from the First Amendment 
challenge. However, in 2001, the Court ruled in U.S. v. United Foods that the mushroom 
advertising program was unconstitutional since the only purpose of the program was 
speech -  that is, advertising. The Court cited the fact that, unlike the California peaches, 
plums, and nectarines program, the mushroom program was a stand-alone program for 
advertising and not part of a broader set of regulations restricting marketing autonomy. 
The Court is set to hear arguments on one of the larger programs (beef), with a decision 
expected in mid-2005.1 As these court battles continue, producers and commodity 
programs face the question of what type of funding mechanism should replace the current 
mandatory ones if (or when) they are ruled unconstitutional.
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An alternative funding mechanism that could potentially yield long-term benefits 
to producers is the provision point mechanism (PPM) for public goods. The PPM, which 
has never been used to fund generic advertising for agricultural commodities, has two 
desirable characteristics given the current legal environment: (1) it is voluntary and thus 
would not likely be vulnerable to legal challenges based on freedom of speech, and (2) it 
has been shown in both the lab and the field to reduce the incentives for free-riding and to 
generate greater total contributions than the VCM does (Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker; 
Suleiman and Rapoport; Dawes et al.; Marks and Croson 1998, 1999; Rondeau, Poe, 
Schulze; Rose et al.).
The PPM operates by announcing a threshold (or goal) for the fundraising 
campaign and soliciting contributions to achieve this threshold. If the threshold is met or 
exceeded, the contributions collected are used to fund the public good; otherwise all of 
the contributions are returned and no funding is provided. In contrast, while a VCM also 
frequently includes the announcement of a goal (such as with fundraising campaigns for 
the United Way, National Public Radio, or religious organizations), the VCM retains 
whatever is contributed regardless of whether the goal is achieved, leaving the 
organization to either adjust to a lower budget level or extend the time frame of the 
fundraising effort.
With the PPM, the combination of the “money-back guarantee” and the threat of 
complete funding shut-down if the threshold is not achieved has been shown to increase 
contributions (Rapoport and Eshed-Levy; Cadsby and Maynes). In situations of complete 
information, the PPM has desirable theoretical properties with the dominant Nash 
equilibrium being for each subject to cost-share, where the sum of contributions equals
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the cost of the threshold (Bagnoli and Lipman). Since mandatory programs are still 
constitutional for most commodities, the economic experimental laboratory provides an 
ideal setting in which to explore the benefits and optimal design of a PPM in case an 
alternative mechanism becomes needed.
Two recent studies (Krishnamurthy; Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze) provide 
experimental evidence of the attractiveness of the PPM for generic commodity 
advertising, showing the PPM to reduce free-riding and generate greater total 
contributions relative to the VCM. Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze further demonstrate that 
critical psychological and economic conditions created in the laboratory can produce 
experimental results for contributing to generic advertising that closely parallel historic 
results observed in the egg industry. However, Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze considered 
only one PPM threshold (70%). Several key questions related to the institutional design 
of a PPM need to be explored to find the combination of features and procedures that 
could lead to maximum producer welfare.
The first question that arises is what impact producer referenda have on 
contributions to the advertising program and, ultimately, on producer surplus. Producer 
referenda are part of essentially all generic advertising programs. Referenda are often 
used when the program is contemplating a change in its operation or funding structure. 
However, the impacts of referenda on public good giving have not previously been given 
much attention. A study by Alm, McClelland, and Schulze suggests that voting creates a 
social norm that can positively affect the level of contributions to public goods. To our 
knowledge no one has examined the impact of referenda on contributions and threshold 
achievement in the PPM.
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The second question is what the optimal threshold for the PPM is. The third 
question is what combination of institutional features leads to stability of contributions to 
the advertising program over time. The fourth question is the impact that effectiveness of 
the advertising program has on producer contributions. These questions are the subject of 
the research summarized in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the 
experimental design is presented. This is followed by a presentation of the results, 
including the application of a mixed-effects econometric model to identify the important 
determinants of producer surplus and contributions to advertising over time. Finally, a 
summary of the main findings and policy implications is presented.
Experimental Design
Each experimental session involved three separate parts. The first two parts were 
designed to familiarize subjects with the experimental platform and to demonstrate to 
subjects the benefits of the advertising program. Part A of the experiment had no 
advertising program, Part B had an advertising program whose funding was mandatory, 
and Part C had an advertising program whose funding was provided through a PPM with 
a varying threshold. The order of these three parts mimics the possible succession of 
generic advertising policies over time should mandatory programs be ruled 
unconstitutional. In each experimental session, twenty subjects assumed the role of 
producer.
Subjects were unaware in advance of the number of parts of the experiment. At 
the beginning of each part, subjects read the instructions and then the administrator orally 
described the experiment and answered all subjects’ questions. The first part of the
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experiment consisted of five rounds and did not include the advertising program.
Subjects were randomly assigned to a computer that had a spreadsheet informing them of 
their costs for producing up to three units of a fictitious commodity. In each round, 
subjects submitted their offers to sell each of their three units. These offers were sent 
directly to an Access database using Visual Basic for Applications. The quantity 
demanded was determined after all the offers were submitted. Subsequently, the 
administrator calculated the market price based on the offers and quantity demanded. 
When notified by the administrator, the subjects retrieved the market price and learned 
whether they had sold some or all of their units. The subjects’ spreadsheets calculated 
their profit in each round.
In the experiment, demand was assumed to be perfectly price inelastic and the 
administrator assumed the role of buyer in the market. For each round, stochastic 
demand was determined by a subject randomly drawing a ball, with replacement, from a 
bag containing labeled bingo balls numbered from forty to forty-six. The number on the 
drawn ball represented the number of units demanded. A triangle distribution, which 
approximates a normal distribution, was used, thereby creating price fluctuations that 
mimicked the price changes observed for many agricultural commodities.2
Since the objective of this research was to answer the four questions related to 
producer contributions in response to varying mechanism designs, the simplifying 
assumption of a perfectly inelastic demand was made to ensure that the stochastic 
demand was transparent to subjects. Furthermore, this assumption helped to ensure 
control over the rate of return on advertising. This assumption is plausible, as previous 
estimated demand elasticities for some agricultural commodities have been quite inelastic
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(e.g., fluid milk, -0.04 (Schmit and Kaiser, 2004); eggs, -0.02 to -0.17 (Brown and 
Schroeder); walnuts, -0.08 (Kaiser, 2002), almonds, -0.20 (Crespi and Chacon-Cascante); 
and pork, -0.20 (Reed, Levedahl, and Clark)).
Each subject could produce up to three units; therefore, in each round there were a 
total of sixty units available. Each subjects’ costs were constant throughout the 
experiment. Subjects paid the cost of producing the units only if the units were 
successfully sold, a simplification that ensured that the experiment had control over the 
rate of return on advertising. The subjects’ first two units cost the same, $1.00, therefore 
all subjects had a strong incentive to have an increase in price. The subjects’ third unit 
cost more, distributed from $1.10 to $5.06, and established the supply elasticity of 0.25. 
The own price elasticity of supply of 0.25 is also in the range of estimates of the supply 
elasticities for agricultural commodities (e.g., milk, 0.30 (Chavas and Klemme),4 eggs, 
0.20 (Schmit and Kaiser, 2003), and beef, short-run 0.05 to long-run 0.45 (Buhr and 
Kim)).
For each round, the market price was determined using a uniform price auction, 
which sets the price for all units sold at the first rejected offer. The uniform price 
auction, also referred to as a Vickrey or A^-price auction, is common in experimental 
settings because of its transparency, ease of administration, and incentive-compatible 
characteristics, especially when the quantity demand has a stochastic component (Davis 
and Holt, Shogren et al.). Once all of the sellers submitted their offers, the administrator 
sorted all of the offers from lowest to highest. A ball would then be drawn to determine 
the quantity of demand and the administrator would purchase all of the units needed. The 
lowest offer not purchased (the first rejected offer) would determine the price for all of
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the units purchased. For example, if  demand was determined to be 43 then the producers 
of the 43 units with the lowest offers would sell their units and receive a price equivalent 
to the 44th lowest offer. In the written and verbal instructions, subjects were informed 
that the market was competitive and therefore, submitting offers equal to their costs was 
in their best interest, because they might otherwise forgo profitable trades.
Part A (no advertising) consisted of five rounds, followed by five rounds in Part B 
(mandatory advertising). In Part B, all sellers were required to pay an assessment for 
each unit sold and these assessments provided the funds for the advertising program that 
increased demand in the subsequent round, thereby creating a one-round lag between the 
cost of the advertising program and its benefits. The increase in demand was determined 
by the equation
(1) D Increase = S ^  At
i=1
where Ai is the amount of assessments collected for each subject, i = 1,...,20 and 
S  e {49,69,89}determines the benefit-cost ratio for the advertising campaign (2:1, 4:1, and 
6:1, respectively). The benefit-cost ratio was constant throughout an experimental 
session. In a step that parallels the publicity provided by commodity programs about the 
benefits of marketing efforts, subjects were informed prior to implementation that the 
advertising program not only increased demand, but that the higher demand would also 
result in higher prices and higher profits for sellers.
In reality, not all producers are notified of the true increase in demand due to 
advertising. However, since independent economic evaluations are required of all federal 
generic advertising programs, many farmers do read or hear about the estimated impacts 
of generic advertising on demand, prices, and profits. For example, the generic dairy
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advertising programs have an annual, independent economic evaluation, and the results 
are widely disseminated to dairy farmers by the government, dairy checkoff program, and 
popular trade magazines.
The assessment rate was set at $0.25 per unit sold, so that when combined with 
the increase in demand, the uniform price auction, and the cost structure described above, 
the rate of return to advertising could be controlled ranging from 2:1 to 6:1. These rates 
of return are similar to the rates of return commonly observed with generic commodities 
(table 1).5 Control of the rate of return was the most critical economic element to 
simulate in the experiment, since the rate of return has been shown to have a direct effect 
on subject behavior in the PPM (see for example Rondeau, Poe, and Schulze). In the 
instructions, subjects were provided with estimates of the expected price that would result 
from different amounts of assessment collected given the experiment’s uniform price 
market, stochastic demand, and cost structure. For each round, in addition to the market 
price, the administrator announced the total assessments collected and the corresponding 
increase in demand.
Simulating the potential change that could result if  mandatory programs are ruled 
unconstitutional, Part C of the experiment replaced the mandatory program with a 
voluntary PPM. It involved fifteen rounds, where subjects experienced five consecutive 
rounds for each of three different PPM thresholds.6 This part also mimicked a funding 
feature common to many generic advertising programs funded via a VCM: refund-by­
request. In such programs, assessments for the advertising campaign were collected at 
the point of sale and producers had to make a written request to get their assessment 
refunded. As shown in Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze, this refund-by-request feature leads
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to increased levels of voluntary contributions in both the VCM and PPM. Thus, in our 
experiments, subjects could request a refund of part or all of their assessment by 
submitting a confidential one-sentence request using instant messaging to the 
administrator (sample message: “Subject #2 requests a refund of $0.75 for Round 8, 
Sincerely, John Doe.”). If a subject did not want to request a refund, no message was 
required. All refund requests were granted and refunds were added to the subject’s 
profits.7
To test the influence of producer referenda on contribution behavior, in one-half 
of the experimental sessions, subjects were asked to submit confidential votes on whether 
they would prefer the PPM with a certain threshold level or whether they would prefer no 
advertising program. Referenda were held prior to the start of a series of rounds for each 
PPM threshold. In the other half of the experimental sessions, subjects were not given a 
choice and were simply informed that for the next series of rounds the advertising 
program would be funded by the PPM with a certain threshold level.
To simulate the democratic decision-making process among producers that occurs 
with generic advertising programs, subjects in the referendum sessions were given five 
minutes to discuss the referendum on the PPM and strategies for making contributions to 
the advertising program. For the non-referendum sessions, subjects were only permitted 
to discuss strategies for making contributions to the advertising program. Such 
conversations are commonly referred to as “cheap talk,” since no binding deals are 
allowed and the actual decisions are confidential. Note that discussion of pricing 
strategies was not allowed in any of the cheap talk conversations.
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Unlike in Part B, where the advertising program was always implemented, in Part 
C the advertising program was implemented only if the PPM threshold was met or 
exceeded.8 The subject participation thresholds used in the experiment were 50%, 70%, 
and 90%. Subjects participated in five consecutive rounds for each of the three 
thresholds. The order of the thresholds was varied for each experimental session to 
mitigate potential order effects. To understand how the PPM operated, consider the case 
where the threshold was 90%. In this case, the advertising campaign would be 
implemented only if at least 90% of the subjects did not request refunds.9 If three or 
more of the twenty subjects in the experiment requested refunds, the advertising program 
was not implemented and all twenty subjects received a refund of their assessments, 
whether they initially requested a refund or not. In the case of a group refund, the round 
operated identically to Part A, where there was no advertising program. In the 
subsequent round, subjects were given the opportunity to reach the threshold again. If the 
threshold was achieved, the advertising program was implemented and the assessments 
collected determined the increase in demand for the subsequent round. After each round, 
the administrator announced the total assessments possible, the total assessments 
collected, the number of subjects not requesting a refund, whether the threshold was 
achieved, and the corresponding increase in demand, if  any.
Results
All experiments were conducted at the Laboratory for XXXX at XXXX University and 
the subjects were recruited from undergraduate economics courses. In total there were 
twelve experimental sessions, each involving twenty subjects (n=240). This section first 
provides aggregate descriptive statistics of the initial eight experiments where the benefit-
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cost ratio of generic advertising was calibrated at 4:1, indicating the importance of the 
referendum on contributions and key trends observed with regard to the referenda and 
PPM thresholds. Then, econometric models are developed to identify the combination of 
institutional mechanisms that are both stable and maximize individual producer surplus 
and contributions to the advertising program. Sensitivity analysis is subsequently 
conducted with the additional experimental data to determine the impact of alternative 
levels of advertising effectiveness on optimal PPM thresholds and subject contributions.
As noted earlier, Part A of the experiment did not include the advertising program 
and was designed so that subjects could become familiar with the experimental platform 
and the uniform price auction. Over these five rounds, the average per round producer 
surplus was at its lowest level of the experiment, $31.17 (table 2). In contrast, in Part B, 
where the advertising program is funded by mandatory assessments, the average producer 
surplus over the five rounds increased to $95.17, the highest of the experiment.10
In Part C, subjects were faced with the decision of how much to contribute 
voluntarily to the advertising program, with funding governed by three different PPM 
thresholds (50%, 70%, and 90%). Under all three PPM thresholds, producer surplus was 
significantly higher ($68.21, $88.96, and $75.06, respectively) than in Part A, where 
there was no advertising, but lower than in Part B, where there was an advertising 
program with mandatory funding (table 2).11
Table 2 also illustrates that referenda do matter with respect to producer surplus 
and contributions to the advertising program. Producer surplus is significantly higher in 
sessions with a referendum than in those without one.12 Recall that all sessions included 
cheap-talk about contribution strategies. Cheap-talk discussions (like public discussions
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among producers) tend to elicit the opinions of those individuals who are more 
extroverted and more open to expressing their opinions in a public setting. In contrast, a 
referendum gives every individual an opportunity to express their opinion as the results 
of the referendum are announced to the group. This difference in producer surplus 
suggests that confidential referenda provide critical feedback to subjects about the 
sentiments of other members of their group toward the PPM threshold and their likely 
behavior should the PPM be approved by vote. Since the votes were overwhelmingly in 
favor of the PPM thresholds (at or above 95% for each threshold), the referenda appear to 
have signaled a greater sense of producer support than was permitted in the cheap-talk 
discussion alone. Since generic advertising programs generally enjoy broad support from 
producers, this finding is particularly relevant to the institutional design of potential 
voluntary generic advertising programs.
The higher producer surplus in the referendum sessions can be attributed to higher 
voluntary contributions to the advertising program from subjects. A striking result, 
displayed in figure 1, is that subjects offered higher average contributions (not accounting 
for whether the threshold was achieved) in the referendum sessions than in the non­
referendum sessions. Using the test of proportions, these contributions were significantly 
higher (a < 0.05) for all PPM thresholds. Even though the percentage of contributions 
was less then the percentage voting in favor of the PPM threshold, it appears that 
including referenda in the program design does significantly increase contributions, and 
thereby, increases producer surplus.
Figure 1 shows the strong positive relationship between group contributions and 
PPM thresholds. That is, a higher PPM threshold leads to higher contributions from
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producers. However, as in other experiments involving repeated PPM rounds (e.g., Isaac, 
Schmitdz, and Walker; Marks and Croson, 1998, 1999), producers did not always reach 
the threshold. In fact, the frequency with which the group achieved the threshold 
declined as the threshold rose (figure 2). For the referendum sessions, as the threshold 
increased from 50% to 70% to 90%, the frequency with which the threshold was 
achieved decreased from 95% to 90% to just 65%, respectively. Likewise, for the non­
referendum sessions, the frequency with which the threshold was achieved went from 
70% to 65% to just 40%, respectively, as the PPM increased over these three thresholds. 
These latter results further illustrate the importance of producer referenda in the 
advertising program design.
In the field, this lack of certainty regarding the achievement of the threshold could 
cause logistical concerns for the advertising agency in charge of the campaign since the 
stream of revenue for advertising could abruptly be turned on and off. Therefore, a 
practical trade-off exists between high levels of producer contributions and actually 
achieving the PPM threshold necessary to implement the program (and retain these 
contributions). We evaluate this tradeoff more formally in the next section, by 
estimating PPM thresholds for which producer surplus and expected advertising 
contribution probabilities are maximized when threshold levels are treated as a 
continuous variable.
Econometric Model
Econometric models were developed to determine the relationships between producer 
surplus and advertising contributions on PPM threshold level, accounting for market 
demand, group referendum type, and treatment round. The models were specified to
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account for the three-level hierarchical nature of the experimental data, where subject- 
level information is nested within experimental groups (or blocks) and observed over 
rounds (i.e., repeated measures). Given the differentiation between group and subject 
effects (fixed or random), we used a General Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) format to 
define the data generating processes; i.e.,
(2) Y = XP + Zu + e ,
where Y is a gsT x 1 vector for the particular dependent variable ( i — 1,..., g  groups, 
j  — 1 ,...,s subjects, and k — 1, . , T time periods), P is an unknown b x 1 vector of fixed- 
effect parameters with known gsT x b design matrix X , u is an unknown c x1 vector of 
random-effect parameters with known gsT x c block design matrix Z  , and e is an 
unknown gsT x 1 random vector of experimental errors that accounts for both the subject 
covariance within groups and autocorrelation of subject errors observed across rounds. 
Note that fixed-effects defined in X and random-effects defined in Z may contain either 
subject-level factors, group-level factors, or both. Further assume that u and e are 
normally distributed random variables with
u 0" "u" "G 0"
E
e
—
0
and Var
e
—
0 R
The variance of Y is therefore 
(4) V = V(Y) = ZGZ + R .
The variance Y is modeled by specifying the forms of Z , G , and R . The model matrix 
Z is set up in the same fashion as matrix X , where a parametric structure is selected for 
the covariance matrices G and R .
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Group effects are represented by random block effects (via Z and u), since the 
groups represent an expected small subset of a larger set of groups over which inference 
about treatment means is to be made. Assuming block effects are distributed normally 
and independently with mean 0 and variance aB , G is a g x g  diagonal matrix with aB 
on the diagonal, and Z a gsT  x g  matrix of ones and zeros reflecting the random block 
effects.
To account for autocorrelation in subject errors across rounds, we assume a 
compound symmetric, within-subject covariance structure, such that for each subject’s T
x T matrix R j we have 13
(5) R  =
a R +a l
aR
a R
_ 2  , 2
a R + a S
• •  a R
2 2 2  a R a R + a S
V i = 1 ,...,g; j  = 1 ,...,s ,
where aR is the autocorrelation compound symmetric variance component between any 
two observations on the same subject and a 2s is the residual within group subject 
variance. The complete g sT x gsT  R  matrix is block diagonal, with each T x T block 
corresponding to a single subject, nested within groups.
When considering alternative PPM thresholds from a marketing/program logistics 
standpoint, being able to sustain the advertising program throughout variations in the 
funding stream is important. Therefore, we conduct additional modeling to determine the 
effect of PPM thresholds on the proportion of assessments contributed to the advertising 
program. Since most contributions are either all (entire assessment) or nothing (full 
refund requested), we model the probability of subject advertising contributions using a 
binomial probit function.14
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Specifically, assume now that Xp + Zu is a generalized linear mixed model of the
underlying process. Then the probability of a subject contribution to the advertising 
program is Prob(contribute) = o ( x p + Zu) . The probit model can be expressed as
(6) z i*k = X k p + Z i u i + where z j k  =
where z*kis the unobserved (latent) variable for group i, subjectj, round k, corresponding
to the observed dependent binary response variable zijk , and the hierarchical error
structure is defined as above with the exception of the probit link error function. 
Empirical Results
As discussed above, since the primary goals of generic advertising programs are to 
expand demand and increase producer returns, we first examine econometrically the 
impact of PPM thresholds on producer surplus to determine the optimal threshold. 
Following the mixed model structure, we hypothesize the empirical model as
(7) GPSRPLSjk = P  + P  ADVCONTjk -  + P 2 D E M AN D + P , PPM^ + P4 PPMfk
+ P5 ROUND ik + P 6 PPM ik GRPREFi + P7 PPM ik ROUND ik + P 8 ROUND ikGRPREFi
+ Ziui + ejk,
where GPSRPLSijk is gross producer surplus for group i, subject j , round k,15 
ADV_CONTjk-1 is the final advertising contribution (assessment less refunds received) for 
group i, subject j , round k-1,16 DEMANDik is market demand for group i, round k, PPMik 
is the provision point threshold for group i, round k, ROUNDik is the round number for 
group i to account for additional round fixed-effects (e.g., behavior change over time) not 
accounted for by the random error assumptions, GRPREFi is a dummy variable reflecting
1 i f  U k  > 0 
0 otherwise
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whether group i is a referendum session (GRPREF=l) or non-referendum session 
(GRPREF=0), and Ziui and eijk reflect the error components as described above.
PPM interaction variables reflect the a priori hypothesis that threshold effects will 
vary across voting group types and over program duration. In addition, given that in the 
referendum sessions subjects voted on implementing the PPM program before the first 
round for each threshold, it is expected that round effects will vary across voting group 
types. PPM thresholds are included in (7) in quadratic form to transform the threshold 
class levels to a continuous basis and thereby allow computation of the threshold where 
producer surplus is maximized.
Subsequently, the advertising contribution probability model was specified as
(8) CONTl]k = &  + frCOSTj + &  PPMlk + &  PPMfk + &  ROUND m + &  PPM lkGRPREFt
+ PPM kROUNDk + Z tu t + ejk,
where CONT jk is equal to one if the group i, subjectj, round k  final advertising 
contribution is greater than zero, and equal to zero if the final contribution is zero, and 
COSTj is the third unit cost for group i, subject j  (costs do not change over time). Recall 
that the final contributions can be equal to zero either by a subject refund request or by a 
group refund, if  the threshold was not achieved; so both individual and group effects are 
inherent in the variable modeled. Since the contributions were not dependent upon the 
previous round, all five rounds for each PPM threshold were used in the analysis. 
Producer Surplus Model Estimates
Regression estimates for both models and utilizing the experimental data calibrated on a 
benefit-cost ratio of 4:1 are included in table 3. All estimated parameters were 
statistically significant for the producer surplus model at the 0.05 significance level or 
less.17 The statistical significance of the covariance parameter estimates lends support to
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the hypothesized three-level hierarchical error structure. As expected, both demand and 
final advertising contribution levels were significantly high given the price impacts from 
changes in demand (as described previously).
PPM thresholds significantly affected producer profits, as did their effects across 
referendum groups and program duration (round). Simulation of the econometric model 
indicates that with the exception of the lowest threshold levels, predicted gross producer 
surplus in the referendum program were dramatically higher than those in the non­
referendum program. For the referendum program, these relationships are illustrated in 
figures 3, which computes predicted gross producer surplus across thresholds and rounds.
Also apparent from the simulation is the answer to the third question regarding 
the stability of producer surplus across rounds. While the sign on ROUND is negative 
suggesting deterioration in return levels over time, when interacted with the other 
variables included in the model, the net effect is one of improved stabilization for the 
referendum program, particularly near the optimal PPM threshold level of 82% (figure 3). 
In fact, model simulations show that the round-by-round changes in gross producer 
surplus were over six times larger in the non-referendum programs than in the 
referendum programs. Certainly, the higher and more stable gross producer surplus 
levels validate the inclusion of voting in PPM-funded programs. That producers can 
maximize higher profit levels at relatively higher PPM thresholds also means that 
additional funding goes to the generic promotion program, resulting in larger demand­
enhancing impacts.
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Subject Advertising Contribution Probability Estimates
As was described above, average intended contributions to the advertising program rose 
with increases in threshold levels; however, at the same time, the frequency of threshold 
achievement fell. While the prospect of a bigger advertising budget under a higher PPM 
threshold is appealing, higher thresholds may be more difficult to achieve, and the 
increased likelihood of non-funded years would make the development of a marketing 
program that much more difficult. A low threshold may be more feasible to achieve, 
making funding for advertising more consistent, but a low threshold also enables more 
producers to “free-ride,” and total contributions are consequently lower.
We conduct additional analysis to examine the subject-level probability of 
positive final advertising contributions across PPM thresholds to evaluate expected 
threshold achievement. By using final advertising contributions, we account for both 
individual refund requests and refunds received as part of a group refund, whether the 
individual subject requested a refund or not. Furthermore, we examine whether optimal 
PPM thresholds for maximizing gross producer surplus levels are consistent with the 
PPM threshold that maximizes the producer’s probability of contributing.
As did the econometric results for producer surplus levels, final contribution 
probabilities demonstrated a statistically significant positive relationship to the PPM 
threshold (table 3).18 The quadratic PPM term was also significant and negative. The 
interaction effect of the referendum with PPM threshold was a significant determinant of 
contribution probabilities. Relative to the referendum program, the non-referendum 
programs demonstrated a greater decrease in contribution probabilities as PPM thresholds 
increased. On a subject-level basis, producers with higher third unit costs were less likely
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to contribute to the advertising program. Program duration (round) had a significant 
effect on contribution probabilities, and, over time, contribution probabilities gradually 
improved at thresholds at or above 62% as the potential to free-ride diminished.
The relationship of the final contribution probability across PPM thresholds and 
rounds (at mean cost level) is illustrated in figure 4 for the referendum program. 
Simulations of the econometric results suggest that threshold and round effects are 
similar for both the referendum and non-referendum programs. However, the predicted 
probabilities are scaled down considerably for the non-referendum program. At lower 
PPM thresholds, contribution probabilities are lower due to the increased ability to free- 
ride, while at higher PPM thresholds contribution probabilities are lower due to the 
increased frequency of not achieving the threshold level.
Overall, the behavior exhibited appears to be approaching the Nash equilibrium of 
cost-sharing, though this study used percent participation, rather than percent 
contribution, as determining whether the threshold was achieved. Evaluated at the final 
round, the maximum contribution probability for the referendum program was 77.5%, 
achieved at a PPM threshold of 76%. Put differently, for an assumed rate of return to 
advertising of 4:1, this implies that a 76% threshold would be met or exceeded 77.5% of 
the time. For the non-referendum program, the maximum contribution probability was 
53.6%, achieved at a PPM threshold of 71%. Furthermore, evaluating the contribution 
probabilities based on the PPM threshold that maximized producer surplus (i.e., 82% for 
the referendum program and 74% for the non-referendum program) indicated only 
slightly smaller contribution probabilities of 76.2% and 53.2%, respectively.
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Sensitivity Analysis on Advertising Effectiveness
As mentioned above, control of the rate of return was the most critical economic element 
to simulate the experiments. Also, given that a wide array of rates of return to generic 
promotion programs exist in the literature, it is useful to examine how changes in this 
return translate into changes in subject behavior and, ultimately, on optimal threshold 
levels. We conducted additional experiments calibrated at return levels both above (6:1) 
and below (2:1) the initial experimental settings. While these additional experiments do 
not capture the entire range or reported payoff ratios, we felt that they provide additional 
insight into the role of program efficacy on contributions in a PPM setting.
As expected, as benefits from advertising increased, so did subject contributions. 
Specifically, the average percentage of contributions increased from 59% in the case of a 
2:1 BCR, to 63% for the 4:1 BCR, and to 68% for the 6:1 BCR across all threshold 
levels. The improved demand enhancing impacts as advertising’s rate of return increased 
were also reflected in the average producer surplus levels across BCRs (table 4).
Supplemental regressions of similar form and specification to the 4:1 BCR data 
were conducted on the additional sets of advertising payoff experiments.19 Given the 
changes in contribution behavior, it is not surprising that as advertising effectiveness 
decreases, so does the PPM threshold level that maximizes gross producer surplus. The 
optimal PPM threshold dropped from 82% to 68% as the BCR decreased from 4:1 to 2:1 
(table 4). Likewise, as effectiveness improved, the optimal threshold level reached the 
maximum threshold level evaluated within the experimental data; i.e., 90%. Expected 
threshold achievement at the 6:1 advertising effectiveness level was similar to that 
observed in the 4:1 case (77% and 76%, respectively). However, as effectiveness
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dropped to 2:1, expected threshold achievement dropped sharply to less than 50% of the 
time (table 4).
The range in optimal thresholds and expected threshold achievement highlights 
the crucial nature of the underlying advertising performance measure in the experimental 
set up. An additional realization is that if  commodity programs go to a voluntary PPM 
type of program, knowledge on the relative performance of their promotions programs 
will be crucial to setting PPM operational parameters in order to maximize the benefits to 
the producers funding the program through their checkoff assessments.
Conclusions
In light of uncertainties about the constitutionality of mandatory generic advertising 
programs for agricultural commodities, it is useful to investigate alternative voluntary 
funding mechanisms in case they become needed. The economics laboratory is an ideal 
environment in which to conduct this investigation, as key economic and psychological 
factors can be simulated, enabling a careful analysis of the impact of various features of a 
funding mechanism on producer contributions to generic advertising programs. The 
focus of this analysis was on finding the combination of features and procedures for the 
Provision Point Mechanism (PPM) that maximizes producer welfare and advertising 
contributions given the varying effectiveness of the advertising program. In addition to 
having a PPM with the “refund-by-request” feature as advocated by Messer, Kaiser, 
Schulze, separate program mechanisms were instituted to investigate the impact of 
producer referenda on contribution levels over a variety of PPM thresholds. The four 
issues examined were: (i) whether a producer referendum on institutional funding 
mechanisms had an impact on producer surplus and contributions to the advertising
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program, (ii) what the optimal threshold was for the PPM, (iii) how institutional features 
impacted the stability of contributions to the advertising program over time, and (iv) how 
does the effectiveness of the advertising program affect producer contributions?
The empirical results indicate that including producer referenda as part of the 
program design positively affects both producer profits and contribution probabilities. 
Given how participation in these referenda strongly affected subjects’ contribution 
behavior, advertising programs should encourage these types of institutions that help 
secure higher funding levels. In addition, a substantially higher degree of program 
stability over time was evident when the program included the referendum and the 
threshold was set at or near the level where producer profits are maximized.
In programs that included the referendum, producer welfare was maximized at a 
PPM threshold of 82%, assuming a benefit-cost ratio of advertising at 4:1. At this 
threshold, program developers should expect that the threshold will be met or exceeded 
76% of the time. Sensitivity analysis also showed direct relationships between the 
effectiveness of the advertising program and both the optimal threshold level and 
expected threshold achievement. For programs with lower returns (2:1), producer 
welfare was maximized at a PPM threshold of 68%, which would be expected to be 
achieved 47% of the time, while for programs with higher returns (6:1), producer welfare 
was maximized at a PPM threshold of 90%, which would be expected to be achieved 
77% of the time.
These results provide valuable information to commodity organizations that wish 
to design promotion programs that may pass constitutional muster and achieve the largest 
benefits possible to the producers who fund them. Understanding that estimated producer
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returns to generic advertising vary over both commodity and time provides direction to 
future research on the evaluation of contribution behavioral changes and how commodity 
organizations should best programmatically respond to these changes. Furthermore, 
extending this type of experimental application to producer groups and commodity 
organizations is a next logical step in making these types of institutional designs practical 
in a real-world setting.
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Footnotes
1 The largest generic advertising program, the dairy farmer program, was ruled 
unconstitutional by the Third Circuit Court in 2004, and may be appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court depending upon its decision in the beef case.
2 The triangle distribution was also used for its transparency to subjects. Alternative 
distributions could be assumed and we leave for future research the implications of these 
distributional assumptions.
4 Chavas and Klemme’s estimated supply elasticity is for a three-year length of run.
5 While the majority of empirical studies have estimated benefit-cost ratios above 1.0, 
there are also some studies (particularly in the meat sector, where there is a lot of cross­
advertising among commodities) that have indicated little or no impact of generic 
advertising on demand. Examples of empirical studies that have found little or no impact 
of generic advertising on demand include Coulibaly and Brorsen, Brester and Schroeder, 
Kinnucan et al.
6 Subjects were unaware of the number of rounds for each PPM threshold.
7 This experiment did not capture the potential affects that the opportunity cost of a 
contribution to the adverting program that is ultimately returned may have subject 
behavior. Earnings treated profits from all the parts of a round equally.
8 In theory, extending the benefits beyond the threshold in this way does not modify the 
individual incentives (Marks and Croson, 1998).
9 To increase transparency, the provision point was the “percentage of subjects not 
requesting refunds,” since the number of subjects was always twenty. Alternatively, the 
provision point could have been the “percentage of assessments collected out of the total 
possible assessments.” However, the total possible assessments varied in each round due
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to the stochastic demand. Additionally, a PPM based on the percentage of producer 
participation is likely to be preferred because of its being perceived as more democratic.
10 The producer surplus measures are designed to help determine the optimal institutional 
features, and should not be interpreted as predictions on the magnitude of producer 
surplus that can be anticipated given these institutional features.
11 Statistical differences in average group producer surplus measures were computed 
using a means difference test, distributed t.
12 Producer surplus in the non-referendum sessions was higher than in the referendum 
sessions of Parts A and B, because of higher average realized demand (stochastic).
13 Alternative autocorrelation structures were investigated for the repeated-subject 
measures, including no correlation and autoregressive order-1 processes. The compound 
symmetric covariance structure better satisfied the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), 
and thus, was preferred. Test statistics and alternative empirical results are available 
upon request.
14 We also modeled the ratio of net advertising contributions to assessment with logistical 
transformations of the dependent variable. However, since most observations were either 
zero or one (i.e., only 6 percent of observations had partial contributions), the empirical 
results and conclusions were nearly identical to those reported for the probit model. The 
additional modeling results are available upon request.
15 Gross producer surplus is defined as subject product sales (market price multiplied by 
units sold) less costs of production, excluding assessments collected or refunds received. 
Net program contributions are accounted for on the right hand side of the equation.
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16 Advertising contributions are based on time period k-1, since total advertising 
contributions in time period k-1 impact demand in time period k. Accordingly, the first 
round of each PPM threshold is dropped from the estimation, since the market demand in 
the first round of each threshold is based on contributions from the prior round, where the 
funding was either a mandatory program or provided via another PPM threshold.
17Econometric models were estimated using the PROC MIXED procedure in SAS v.8.2.
18 Note that DEMAND is not included as an explanatory variable in the Probit model.
Not only did the inclusion of this variable result in much poorer model performance 
(AIC=8330.5), but most importantly since subject advertising contributions are based on 
the assessment collected this indicates directly the quantity of units sold. As such 
DEMAND is given and need not be included.
19 For brevity, the supplemental regression estimates are not included, but are available 
upon request. Optimal PPM thresholds and expected threshold achievement are 
computed analogously to the 4:1 benefit-cost ratio case.
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Table 1. Estim ated average benefit-cost ratios for generic advertising and promotion
program s for various commodities.
Commodity Study Benefit-Cost Ratio
U.S. dairy advertising Kaiser (1997) 3.4
U.S. beef advertising Ward (1998) 4.9 to 6.7
U.S. cotton promotion Nichols et al. (1997) 3.2 to 3.5
U.S. soybean export promotion 
& production research Williams et al. (1998) 8.3
Canadian butter advertising Goddard and Amuah (1989) 1.0
Florida orange juice advertising Capps et al. (2003) 2.9 to 6.1
Washington apple advertising Ward and Forker (1991) 7.0
Walnut domestic promotion Kaiser (2002) 1.65 to 9.72
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Table 2. Average Group Producer Surplus and Expected Contributions (Benefit-Cost 
Ratio 4:1).
Part A Part B ______ Part C -  Threshold_____
Producer Surplus_________ (No Program) (Mandatory) 50%_______ 70%_______ 90%
P art Comparison
All Sessions (All Groups) $ 31.17 $ 95.17 $ 68.21 $ 88.96 $ 75.06
Difference from Part A
. * * 
$ 64.00
. * * 
$ 37.04
. * * 
$ 57.79
. * * 
$ 43.89
Difference from Part B
. * * 
$-26.96
 ^ ** 
$ -6.21
. * * 
$-20.11
Difference from Part C (50%)
. * * 
$ 20.75
. * * 
$ 6.85
Difference from Part C (70%)
. * * 
$-13.90
G roup Comparison
Referendum Group $ 29.98 $ 91.93 $ 77.96 $ 92.60 $ 92.31
Non-Referendum Group $ 32.35 $ 98.41 $ 58.46 $ 85.33 $ 57.82
Difference
 ^ ** 
$- 2.37 -
. * * 
$- 6.48 -
. * * 
$ 19.50—
 ^ ** 
$ 7.27—
. * * 
$34.49 -
G roup Com parison, Expected C ontribution
Referendum Group 62.9% 70.6% 58.3%
Non-Referendum Group 35.5% 48.4% 33.2%
Difference
*  *
27.4% -
* *
22.2% -
* *
25.1% -
n=160
* statistically significant at the 0.05 level, ** statistically significant at the 0.01 level or less
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Table 3. Regression Results for Subject Producer Surplus and Probability of 
Advertising Contribution (Benefit-Cost Ratio 4:1).
Variable
Dependent Variable
Producer Surplus 1/0 Final Advertising 
Per Round ($)a Contributionb
IN T E R C E PT -10.8288** -3.5283**
(0.7073) (0.7751)
C O ST -0.0621*
(0.0338)
ADV_CONT-1 0.6167**
(0.0894)
D EM A N D 0.2789**
(0.0072)
PPM 0.0510** 0.1217**
(0.0160) (0.0212)
PPM *PPM -0.0004** -0.0010**
(0.0001) (0.0001)
PPM *G R PR E F 0.0078** 0.0091**
(0.0024) (0.0030)
R O U N D -0.1292** -0.2535**
(0.0800) (0.0866)
R O U N D *PPM 0.0039** 0.0041**
(0.0011) (0.0012)
R O U N D *G R PR E F -0.2215**
(0.0353)
Covariance Parameter Estimates:
g R (G roup) 1.1822* 0.2953*
(0.6566) (0.1664)
o\ (Subject) 0.7141** 0.8921**
(0.0248) (0.0283)
g R (Round) 0.5081** 0.0786**
(0.0669) (0.0169)
Fit Statistics:
-2 R es Log L ikelihood 5047.2 7339.6
A IC 5053.2 7345.6
PPM Level where Dependent Variable Maximize (mean ROUND)
G R PR E F = 1 (Y es) 82 73
G R PR E F= 0  (No) 74 68
(standard errors in parentheses)
*Significant at the 10% level **Significant at the 5% level or less 
a Producer Surplus is equal to subject gross profit, excluding advertising contributions. 
b Binomial error distribution with probit link function
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Table 4. Subject Contributions and Optimal PPM  Threshold, by Advertising R eturn 
Level.
Descriptor 2:1
Benefit-Cost Ratio 
4:1 6:1
Average Percentage of Contributions 59% 63% 68%
Average Subject Producer Surplus 3.29 4.54 6.29
Optimal PPM Threshold 68% 82% 90%
Expected Threshold Achievement 47% 76% 77%
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